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neither justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment of the person con-
cerned nor carried out in his or her interest, and which cause death to or seriously 
endanger the health of such person or persons;142  
(xii)  Destroying or seizing the property of an adversary unless such destruction or sei-
zure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of the conflict;143  
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141  The prohibition of medical or scientific experiments cover the use of therapeutic methods which 
are not justified on medical grounds and not carried out in the interest of the affected person. 
The consent of the victim is not relevant. 
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143  This provision is parallel, mutatis mutandis, to Article 8(2)(b)(xiii) ICC Statute and reflects 
customary international humanitarian law (Rule 50 ICRC Study, see also Henckaerts and Dos-
wald-Beck, 2005). 
The ICC Elements of Crimes set out the constitutive elements of the war crime of destroy-
ing or seizing the enemy’s property: 1) The perpetrator destroyed or seized certain property; 2) 
such a property was of an adversary; 3) such property was protected from the destruction or sei-
zure under the international law of armed conflict; 4) the perpetrator was aware of the factual 
circumstances that established the status of the property; the destruction of the property was not 
required by military necessity; 5) the conduct took place in the context and was associated with 
an armed conflict not of an international character; 6) the perpetrator was aware of factual cir-
cumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict. 
Article 8(2)(e)(xii) has been invoked as ground of charges against, inter alia, Callixte Mba-
rushimana (Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, ICC PT. Ch. I, Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges, ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red, 16 December 2011) and Bosco Ntaganda (Prosecutor v. 
Ntaganda, ICC PT. Ch. II, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on 
the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06-309, 9 June 2014, pa-
ra. 72 ff.). Likewise, the crime of destruction of enemy’s property has been imputed to German 
Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui under Article 8(2)(b)(xiii). Such a legal basis was subse-
quently modified into Article 8(2)(e)(xii) after the requalification of the conflict from interna-
tional to non-international. 
In the judgment in the case Prosecutor v. Katanga (Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC T. 
Ch. II, Jugement rendu en application de l’Article 74 du Statut, ICC-01/04-01/07-3436, 7 March 
2014, para. 889 ff.), the Trial Chamber clarified the scope of Article 8(2)(e)(xii) stating that “ri-
en n’indique que les éléments constitutifs du crime visé à l’Article 8-2-e-xii sont différents de 
ceux du crime de destruction des biens de l’ennemi commis dans le cadre d’un conflit armé in-
ternational et visé à l’Article 8-2-b-xiii” (para. 889). Such a statement is supported by authorita-
tive doctrine (see Dörmann, pp. 485–86). Based on this, the analysis of Article 8(2)(e)(xii) may 
occur by analogy with Article 8(2)(b)(xiii) ICC Statute. 
The provision criminalises the destruction or seizure of enemy’s property protected by the 
law of armed conflicts. There exists a plurality of ways in which the destruction of property may 
be carried out. The Trial Chamber has exemplified some of them, namely, “par des acts tels que 
l’incendie, le démantèlement ou toute autre forme de dégradation de biens” (Prosecutor v. Ka-
tanga, T. Ch. II, Jugement rendu en application de l’Article 74 du Statut, ICC-01/04-01/07-
3436, 7 March 2014, para. 891), concluding that property heavily damaged can be assimilated to 
partly destroyed property and can thus fall under the terms of Article 8(2)(e)(xii) (Prosecutor v. 
Katanga, T. Ch. II, Jugement rendu en application de l’Article 74 du Statut, ICC-01/04-01/07-
3436, March 2014, para. 891). In the case Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, the Pre-Trial Cham-
ber confirmed the charge of destruction of property against the defendant for having destroyed 
houses, buildings and other permanent structures, set on fire houses or removed their metal 
roofs, destroyed fields, destroyed and burned villages (Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, ICC PT. Ch. 
II, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Pros-
ecutor Against Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06-309, 9 June 2014, paras. 72–73). Similarly, 
destruction of property may occur by “setting fire to, pulling down, or otherwise damaging the 
adversaries’ property” (Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, ICC PT. Ch. I, Decision on the Confirma-
tion of Charges, ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red, 16 December 2011, para. 171). 
As to the “seizure” of property, neither the ICC Statute nor the Elements of Crimes help 
clarify the meaning of the term. According to the ICRC Commentary, seizure is to be distin-
guished from requisition because the former relates to public property and is a temporary se-
questration followed by restitution and indemnity; the latter affects private property and consists 
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(xiii)  Employing poison or poisoned weapons;144 
                                                                                                                        
in a passage of ownership (Pictet, 1958, p. 296). However, this point remains debated in the lit-
erature and unclarified by the ICC case law (for a recollection of relevant positions, cf. Dör-
mann, 2003, pp. 256–57). 
The notion of property is quiet broad. It includes property of natural and legal persons, 
moveable and immoveable, public and private, provided that they are of the adverse party 
(Prosecutor v. Katanga, Jugement, para. 892). The Trial Chamber has shed light of the meaning 
of adverse, notably, “alliées ou faisant allégeance à une partie au conflit opposée ou hostile à 
l’auteur du crime” (in Katanga Judgment, para. 892). Such an adverse character can be estab-
lished by virtue of the ethnic origin of the persons whose property has been destroyed (or partly 
destroyed) or seized or based on their place of residence (Prosecutor v. Katanga, Jugement, pa-
ra. 892). 
Article 8(2)(e)(xii) applies to individual acts of destruction or seizure of enemy’s property 
which are protected by the law of armed conflict and does not require any element of extensive-
ness as opposed to Article 8(2)(a)(iv)) (“Extensive destruction and appropriation of property 
[…] carried out unlawfully and wantonly”). 
The destruction of enemy property does not constitute a crime under the terms of the Statute 
if such a destruction was “imperatively demanded by the necessities of the conflict”. Such an 
expression has been regarded as substantively equivalent to “military necessity” and interpreted 
in line with the ICTY case law (Prosecutor v. Katanga, T. Ch. II, Jugement rendu en application 
de l’Article 74 du Statut, ICC-01/04-01/07-3436, March 2014, para. 894). Military necessity is 
therefore meant as “nécessité de measures indispensables pour attaindre les buts de guerre, et 
légales selon les lois et coutumes de la guerre” (Lieber Code, Article 14, cited in Prosecutor v. 
Katanga, T. Ch. II, Jugement rendu en application de l’Article 74 du Statut, ICC-01/04-01/07-
3436, 7 March 2014, para. 894).  
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144  This offence could, for example, include the poisoning of water supplies. The production and 
storage of poison is not prohibited. There is no agreement whether the prohibition on the use of 
poison covers poison gas. Article 8(2)(b)(xvii) is an identical provision to the present provision, 
but applies in international armed conflicts. 
The provision does not prohibit chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. This 
may be explained the lack of agreement on the prohibition on of nuclear weapons and a follow-
ing compromise during the Rome conference, with the result that weapons of mass destruction 
are not subject to an explicit and binding provision in the ICC Statute. 
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